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Introduction 
On July 9 2011 South Sudan gained independence after the longest running civil war. Before 
independence, South Sudan was part of the United Sudan, where differences in terms of culture and 
heritage between North and South are not unknown to the public. The North is predominantly Arab 
Muslim and the South is composed of many different religious groups. It divided the country in an 
“us” versus “them” situation that grew ever more prominent during the decades of civil war, 1955-
1973 and 1983-2005 (Howden 2013b).  
After independence in 2011 the country was characterised by peace and hope. However, the peace 
was short-lived: In 2013 internal conflicts in government broke out. Power dynamics and conflicts 
between the president, Salva Kiir, and the ex-president, Riek Machar, resulted in the third biggest 
refugee crisis in the world today.   
The hopes in South Sudan for the new state was in 2013 replaced by fear, despair and insecurity and 
have led 2.4 million people to flee the country and 1.8 million are internally displaced.  
This caused me to wonder how and why South Sudan, which for so many decades were part of a 
civil war, is now itself facing what appears to be the exact same civil war internally in South Sudan 
that it endured as part of the Sudan. South Sudan experience discrimination of different ethnicities 
and a power struggle gone so much out of hand, that it is putting independence and recognition of 
the state at risk. With a strong hope of creating a new state based on one identity that would stand 
together, Salva Kiir said these words in 2011: ”We have waited 56 years for this day. It is a dream 
that has come true!” (Kiir 2011), but what happened to the dream and the state-building process in 
South Sudan? Has it failed?  
 
A short walk-through of South Sudanese Becoming  
Many of the borders in Africa were drawn up in the 18th century during colonialism. The borders 
were often negotiated between two colonial powers, based on a question of access to oil reservoirs, 
among other things, thus separating Africa’s many different cultural, religious, etc. groups making 
 
 
them belong to two or more countries. This immediately brings up a question of identity and a sense 
of belonging or not belonging within the borders of ones designated country. I do not claim that it is 
not possible for a country with various cultural, religious, political groups to peacefully live 
together, allow and respect each other and still have a sense of belonging and identifying with the 
overall identity. However, many conflicts in African countries have been characterised by ethnic 
differences and disputes over land (Burke 2018).  
With the new borders and external reign from colonial powers came new political systems, which 
were imposed on communities, where new local rulers were chosen without any consideration of 
the existing hierarchy, social norms, history, etc.  
During colonialism, European-like institutions were implemented throughout colonies in the world 
in order to maintain control over resources. Welfare and security for the people were low on the 
agenda for colonial rulers, which of course had consequences for the countries after they gained 
sovereignty. Money was not spent on infrastructure or rural development, only in areas where this 
was necessary in order to get to oil or trade roads or seas (Eriksen 2010: 38).  
In the unified Sudan, the British-Egyptian colonial time had influence on the future of the 
independent South Sudan. The colonial period for Sudan lasted until 1956. During this period the 
North was always more important than the South. This was evident by the fact that schools were 
made to better educate people in the North for certain jobs in government that the British would not 
take upon them themselves. Though it was a selfish act from the British side, the North would later 
benefit from it by taking over power from the British, when they left in 1956. Moreover, the South 
was left to itself and was cut off from the benefits of living in the North. This created an even 
bigger divide between the two regions (Sharkey 2003: 4-7).  
With the British leaving, the North took over governing the country, a so called institutional 
appropriation, where the colonised do not necessarily have the same interest as the colonisers, but 
merely an interest in maintaining a certain social order that had already been established. An order 
where the North would be able to access oil in the South and be in charge of its people. This also 
meant that the South again did not have any influence in government, just like during British rule, 
and still no money was granted for development of the South. This marginalisation of the South led 
to two civil wars in the united Sudan, before the South finally got independence in 2011, which a 
few years later was overshadowed by power struggles between the President, Salva Kiir, and the 
Vice-President, Riek Machar.  
 
 
South Sudan had ambitions to become a great state that would no longer force its people to flee; it 
would create economic stability; and not least, peace and safety for the people (Kiir 2011). Instead, 
after the euphoria of independence waned off, Salva Kiir seemed only interested in maintaining 
power (Johnson 2016: 160). Offers from official international counsellors to help strengthen and 
build a stable and strong structure for the state was declined, and the people in charge would rely on 
their own skills and knowledge – not saying that the situation would have looked any different, as 
there is examples around the world of international interventions gone very wrong or at least have 
left again and the country being at status quo.   
By creating a government based on personal ties or common ethnicity, the structures in society 
reproduced themselves (Eriksen 2010: 40). By prioritising power, development policies, 
infrastructure and security were given lower priority, and thereby sustaining the people in the same 
position as they had been in for decades, both during colonialism and within unified Sudan.  
These signs of a weak government, people fleeing the country and ethnic disputes, made the 
international community call South Sudan a failed state.  
 
The Notion of the State and Discourse of State Failure  
The discourse of failed states has a tendency to centre on the notion of state and its characteristics. 
The notion of the state is usually one built on European/Western ideas and norms. The discourse of 
failed states is often used to describe countries in the global south due to political instability and 
violence. Stein Sundstøl Eriksen (2010) has tried to challenge the way we perceive and understand 
the notion of the state. The most common ways to understand the state is to see it as a service 
provider or one that is able to uphold its monopoly of violence (2010: 29); these services could be 
security, rule of law, protection, infrastructure, etc. So, when a state is not able to provide these 
services nor able to uphold its monopoly of violence, then it will be characterised as “failed”.  
Eriksen argues that with these two definitions of what a state is, nearly all states in the world would 
be characterised as failed. Furthermore, he categorises this way of thinking as a test you have to fail 
or pass in order to be part of the international community and seen as a state.  
Basically, Eriksen is calling the notion of the state an out-dated and idealised version of a Western 
state, which is why we need to come up with a new definition:  
 “[…] the experience of non-Western states can only be understood as 
deviations from the ‘normal’ development experienced by Western states. By 
implication, the absence of anything like a modern state in many countries is 
 
 
seen as a problem to be addressed, to enable a ‘normal’ state to emerge.” 
(Eriksen 2010: 32).  
Eriksen instead proposes a model that is more inclusive and truer to the collection of countries of 
which the world consists today, where there is room for variation from the standard. That is, a state 
is not failed just because it sits outside the ‘normal’. We, the people in the Western states need to 
remember that the Western model is not the only model. What works for us, might not work in 
other countries with different history, cultures, religions, etc. At the same time, we can agree that a 
state characterised by violence, ethnic conflict and corruption is also not an optimal way to rule a 
country and build a state. With a new model of the notion of the state, both these types of states will 
be able to see themselves in the notion of state without being ‘failed’.  
The new notion should focus on the process and the outcome of choices made in a state-building 
process, where you not only look at what is currently happening, but also at why, who and how the 
state is shaped, for example by looking at colonialism, the external factor bringing in European-like 
institutions, etc.  
All states consist of a territory with an appertaining population, and this territory has a government, 
which is recognised by the other states (ibid: 36-38) Moreover, the state have laws, an army, police 
and other formal institutions. These components of the state are allowed to come in different shapes 
and sizes, that is, the laws may vary, the police do not have to have the monopoly over violence, the 
services the state provides can differ. By allowing for these differences in the way of governing the 
state is less likely to be characterised as failed, as the definition will be more inclusive.  
 
Weak Institutions  
The reasons for South Sudan to end up in yet another civil war are many and can vary, depending 
on how one chooses to analyse the situation. The power struggle between Kiir and Machar, who 
belong to the Dinka and Nuer respectively is an important factor in potential conflicts. During years 
of fighting they both found a way in which to mobilise people in order to gain power. These years 
have had severe consequences on not only the people, but also on state institutions that might have 
been weak in the first place. Institution structures were inherited by the old regime, Sudan, whose 
institutions were not strong themselves. Institutions are supposed to correspond to the time in which 
we live, but when state institutions are based on a Western ideal, as Eriksen mentions, it can be 
challenging for a non-Western country to comply with international standards. To the outside it 
seemed like South Sudan was trying to change, e.g. by creating new laws against corruption. These 
 
 
laws were just not complied with, which in time will weaken institutions as they no longer have any 
effect and, in the end, make them irrelevant (Johnson 2016: 90-92). Alongside this, big changes in 
government personnel has also been a contributing factor to why the South Sudanese 
government/state is viewed as weak or according to the discourse of failed states, failed.  
The mobilising of the Dinka and the Nuer respectively, by Kiir and Machar, is a contributing factor 
in leading South Sudan on the road to undermine state institutions, on which the state should be 
built: “Through their practices, actors may either contribute to or undermine the possibility of 
creating the kind of state presupposed by the idea of the state underlying formal institution” 
(Eriksen 2010: 36).  
According to Eriksen, the choices made during its independence have contributed to the shaping of 
weak institutions, in that sense making main actors, both government personnel and rebels, 
responsible for the shaping of the South Sudanese state. The paradox is that South Sudan is 
recognised as a state, but yet some experts still choose to fail the country as a state, maybe showing 
that the standards of the current notion of state is too high or too one sided and non-inclusive of 
non-western states, why Eriksen’s view on the discourse of failed states is a breath of fresh air.   
 
Who failed whom?  
What can be said about South Sudan is that the dream of a unified South Sudan has failed for now. 
Salva Kiir had a big dream of uniting the South under one identity and finally building the peaceful 
state all had hoped for in so many decades. In that sense the dream failed, Salva Kiir failed his 
people and the standards he set forth for the state more than the state has failed within the classical 
discourse of state and state-failure.  
“Let all citizens of this new nation be equal before the law and have equal 
access to opportunities and equal responsibilities to serve the motherland. 
We are all South Sudanes.” (Kiir 2011).  
What failed was the idea of a unified South Sudan, where power struggles instead took over and 
changed the focus from wanting to build a strong state for the people to a situation, where the 
people are now fleeing their homes.  
In the understanding of the state suggested by Eriksen, South Sudan meets the overall requirements 
of what a state is. It has a territory, a government, a fragile one, but it is there, it does have a 
population, laws, armies and institutions inspired by those from Europe, a remnant from the 
 
 
colonial period. These factors just tell us how the state is operated, not that it has failed at being a 
state.  
 
So, who failed whom? Is it possible to speak of a situation where the notion of failed state has 
failed? Or are we in the West even in a position, where we can define what a state is supposed to do 
or what requirements it has to meet in order to be member of the international community? 
One way could be to follow the idea that Eriksen has posed that is based on looking at processes of 
state building and state-maintenance and look at which processes lead to a strong or weak state and 
hereby learn more about the individual states.  
So maybe both internal and external actors have played a role in the reproduction of the ‘old’ notion 
of the state, which has made it more difficult to build a state that corresponds to its history, people 
and conditions in the states’ territory.  
In South Sudan the British, Sudan (the North) and Salva Kiir, Riek Machar and other government 
actors have influenced the current state of the country and its state-building process. The youngest 
country in the world is still struggling to find the right way that works for it. In the meantime, 
people are still fleeing the country, which is not a great testament to the choices being made by 
actors in South Sudan. A new peace agreement has just been signed by both parties, Riek Machar 
and Salva Kiir, on 13 September 2018 in Ethiopia. It states that Riek Machar will be reinstated as 
Vice-President in South Sudan, from which he was dismissed in 2013. If reinstating Riek Machar as 
Vice-President, one out of five, will be complied with only time will tell, as both parties of the 
conflict have broken peace agreements before.  
Maybe this new way of perceiving the state will be a more inclusive one and will lead to more 
understanding of why some states act as they do and thereby allowing states’ mistake without 
categorising them as failed, and hence shutting down the possibility for the Western world to 
intervene in yet another conflict in the World, for which they may also carry some of the 
responsibility. Maybe it is taking it too far, but change is long overdue in my opinion in relation to 
what a state is, what it is based on and how it should act both domestically and internationally.  
 
So, what happened to the dream in South Sudan? The dream seems to have been overshadowed by 
other things for people in power positions in South Sudan that instead got caught up with conflict 
over power, people and territory, thus ending up with fragile state institutions and slowing the state-
building process down. For the people the dream continues, the dream of living in one’s own 
 
 
country in peace. Even state leaders seem to remember the dream that once was by signing a new 
peace agreement and showing its people that two persons with different cultural backgrounds can 
agree on one thing – that peace is best for South Sudan. Failure or not, the state still stands and is 
recognised by the international community, with or without help from the outside. South Sudan and 
its leaders are on a road to exchange conflict and fear for peace and a state with strong institutions. 
The way they choose to do it is not important as long as it gets there without harming more people 
and thus leading them with no other choice than to flee the country. Maybe we all failed South 
Sudan, the British, the Egyptians, Sudan even themselves, what it shows is that it is a tough and 
difficult task leading and creating a state that all parties can be satisfied with, why focusing on 
original dream of South Sudan is to be remembered, when trying to recreate a state with value for 
all its people.  
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